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Sound as Hermeneutic, or Helmholtz
and the Quest for Objective Perception
DAVID TRIPPETT
No doubt is now entertained that beauty is subject to laws and
rules dependent on the nature of human intelligence. . . . The
principal difficulty in pursuing this object is to understand
how regularity can be apprehended by intuition without
being consciously felt to exist.
—Hermann von Helmholtz, 1863
Sound is a finely attenuated substance, which is radiated from
the sound-producing body by an unknown law of diffusion.
—Alexander Wilford Hall, 1877
On 3 August 1878, Helmholtz gave an hour-long
speech at the Frederick William University in
Berlin entitled “The Facts of Perception.” It
was his final speech as University Rector (com-
memorating the birthday of the university’s
founder), and many colleagues reportedly fell
asleep: clad in formal robes amid the baking heat
of high summer, perhaps anticipating the reel of
prizes yet to be awarded.1
If the occasion was academically banal, the
topic could not have been more significant to
the speaker. In its published form, it would
become of signal importance for conceiving the
relation of sense organs to an external world,
and colleagues expressed the hope that it would
advance the “ideal interests at German universi-
ties and thereby avoid the negative consequencesThe epigraphs are cited from: Hermann von Helmholtz, On
the Sensations of Tone, 4th edn., trans. Alexander Ellis (New
York: Dover, 1954), 235; Alexander Wilford Hall, The
Problem of Human Life: Embracing the ‘Evolution of Sound’
and Evolution Evolved (New York: Hall & Co., 1877), 76–77.
This research was made possible by a Starting Grant from
the European Research Council.
1David Cahan, Helmholtz: A Life in Science (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2018), 545.
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of a crass materialism.”2 It drew on decades of
empirical research into the physiological mecha-
nisms of sight and audition and served as
Helmholtz’s crowning statement on epistemol-
ogy. With predictable ecumenism, he positioned
as complementary the methods of natural sci-
ence and philosophy, the former separating off
what originates in the material world, the latter
what originates in the mind. Combining these
perspectives in a grand gesture, he ventured reas-
surance through objective behavior: “the laws of
thought in men who pursue natural science are,
of course, ultimately no different than in those
who do philosophy.”3 A persuasive point. Yet
the key questions driving each endeavor since
the university’s founding in 1811 remained unan-
swered, despite decades of enquiry and experi-
ment: “‘What is truth in our intuitions and
thought? And in what sense do our ideas corre-
spond to reality?’” Natural science and philoso-
phy approached this problem from opposite
sides, he avers, yet “it is a common task of
both.”4 Sixty-seven years on and satisfactory ans-
wers remained elusive.
In this potentially frustrating situation, the
question of culpability was inevitable. Helmholtz
sought to distance himself from what he called
the“weaknessesofRomanticism,”namely,asitu-
ation in which the more fantasy freed itself from
“the rules of the understanding” the more one
had to “admire it as a creative force.” Romantic
metaphysics, in this reading, became a cipher for
disreputable abstraction, a form of “vanity that
revelled in high ideals.”5 From the pantheon—or
rogue’s gallery—of German idealists, Helmholtz
associated it above all with Johann Gottlieb
Fichte, his predecessor (as the university’s
second rector), whom he politely, if wryly, cre-
dits with “moral inspiration” and “bold intel-
lectual flights of . . . idealism,”6 even as he
consoled listeners there is no shame if work
toward new lawfulness “does not at once suc-
ceed in the first assault of a flight of Icarus.”7 It
is indicative of the boldness with which he
approached this pivot away from speculative
philosophy that the original title for his lecture
had been simply: “What Is Real?”
This article considers the role of sound within
epistemological debates over sense perception
and concepts of the real during the later nine-
teenth century. It examines the ways in which
sound’s abstract character became co-opted
within Anglo-German discourse concerning
objective perception and the scientifically real,
initially through the lens of Helmholtz’s 1878
lecture, but later broadening this focus to
include the mid-century architects of a philo-
sophical materialism, as well as their detractors.
A closing case study, a closely documentedwager
about the “real” of sound ca. 1850, demonstrates
the imaginative uses of sound as a metonym for
philosophical debate, raising questions about
the relation of sensation and number, and the
underlying desire to possess objects of sensory
experience.
OBJECTIVITY
Since the 1840s, reaction against Hegel’s specula-
tive idealism has spawned a cluster of philosoph-
ical writings that laid claim to the authority of
natural science. Chief among these were the so-
called scientific materialists, Jacob Molleschott,
2These words from the jurist Johann Bluntschli, cited in
Ludwig Nohl to Helmholtz, 7 August 1878. See Hermann
von Helmholtz Nachlass, Akademiearchiv, Berlin-
Brandenbursische Akademie der Wissenschaft, Berlin, 332.
There are other indications that Helmholtz had prioritized
this lecture. He had recently overseen the establishment of
the Physics Institute at the University, costing 1,264,000
marks, and the sheer quantity of logistical matters forced
him to turn down prestigious invitations, such as the
Chemical Society’s Faraday Lecture. See Cahan, Helmholtz:
A Life in Science, 456–57.
3Helmholtz, “The Facts in Perception,” in Science and
Culture: Popular and Philosophical Essays, ed. David
Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 344
(emphasis added).
4Ibid., 344.
5Ibid., 343.
6Ibid., 342. It is a matter of record that Fichte’sWissenschafts-
lehre (1794) itself opens with an appeal for the unfalsifiable
“facts” of consciousness and “the laws (of common logic)
whereby onemust straightway think [of] this Act [the primor-
dial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human
knowledge] as the foundation of human knowledge or . . .
the rules whereby this reflection is initiated” (93). Yet such
laws have not yet been proven valid, Fichte laments, and
are dependent on the so-called absolute unconditional
principle (“Act”), creating “a circle, though an unavoidable
one.” See Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, trans. Peter
Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982), 93.
7Helmholtz, “The Facts,” 366.
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Karl Vogt, and Ludwig Büchner,8 who believed in
the universal reign of natural law and regarded
matter as objectively real, imperishable sub-
stance with thought as its by-product: “the
immortality of matter is now an established
truth.”9 In less extreme terms, but within a
related context, Helmholtz too sought firmer
ground. His valediction asked the assembled
dons what was objective in perception. In con-
trast to idealism ca. 1811, with its “inspiration,
energy, ideal hopes, and creative thoughts,”
he wanted to show how law-like tendencies
underpinned sensory experience, which in the
context of the natural sciences meant regard-
ing sensation as proximate to “the world of
reality, whose laws [science] seeks.”10 Rather
than stimulating an individual’s creative imag-
ination (for Coleridge, a non-mechanical fac-
ulty, “the living power and prime Agent of all
human Perception”), sense organs were to be
governed by natural laws as deterministic and
verifiable as those of Newtonian mechanics:
Each natural law says that, given preconditions
which are alike in certain respects, consequences
which are alike in certain other respects will
always follow. Since likeness in our world of sensa-
tion is shown by like signs [cf. Zeichentheorie],
then there will also correspond to the natural-law
consequence of like effects upon like causes[,] a reg-
ular consequence in the field of our sensations.11
The value placed here on “likeness” between
sensation and “sign” indicates that it was
Helmholtz’s early theory of signs that serves as
the platform on which this later quest for objec-
tivity stood. Recall that this concerned the
causal relation between sensation and object in
the external world. It held that human sensa-
tions provide only mediated information about
the peculiar external influence stimulating
human bodies: “it can pass for a sign—but not
an image,” he explains of vision. “For we require
from an image some sort of similarity with the
object imaged: from a statue, similarity of form,
from a drawing, equality of perspectival projec-
tion in the visual field; and from a painting, sim-
ilarly of colors. A sign, however, need not have
any type of similarity with what it is a sign
for.”12 This non-mimetic relation between sign
and referent is not arbitrary, however. In fact, it
is “so restricted” that the same object takes the
same effect under equal circumstances (a princi-
ple later taken up by Charles S. Peirce):13 “hence
unequal signs always correspond to unequal
effects,” which—in a visualist context—he dub-
bed: “the imaging of the lawlike in the processes
of the real world.”14
Helmholtz regarded the desire for lawful-
ness as deeply human. Humans possess an
innate “intellectual drive to consider every-
thing that happens as law-like, that is, compre-
hensible,” he retorted to Jan Pieter Nicolaas
Land, a Dutch neo-Kantian who had recently
accused him of ignoring essential methodolog-
ical differences between physics and philoso-
phy.15 We will return to Land, but for now,
the impulse toward objectivity and the applica-
tion of seemingly objective criteria to the percep-
tion of artworks—coeval with the emergence of
psychophysics—can be traced across a range
of sympathetic writers. Predictably, the usage
of terms such as “objectivity,” by the 1850s a
voguish term, shifts markedly by discipline.16
8See Annette Wittkau-Horgby, Materialismus: Entstehung
und Wirkung in den Wissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998); as well as
Frederick Gregory’s classic Scientific Materialism in
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Dodrecht: D. Reidel, 1977).
9Ludwig Büchner, Force and Matter, ed. and trans. J.
Frederick Collingwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), 17.
10Helmholtz, “The Facts,” 342, 345.
11Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, or
Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions,
2 vols., ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1983), I, 304, 348.
12Helmholtz, “The Facts,” 347 (trans. modified).
13What Peirce, in 1909, calls the “final interpretant” constitu-
tes nothing less than “the effect the Sign would produce in
any mind upon which the circumstances should permit it to
work out its full effect.” Charles S. Peirce to Lady Welby, 14
March 1909, in Semiotics and Significs: The Correspondence
between Charles S. Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 110.
14Helmholtz, “The Facts,” 348 (emphasis added). The influ-
ence of Helmholtz’s thought on Charles Sanders Peirce, who
wrote an obituary for Helmholtz in The Nation, is briefly
explored in M. Gail Hamner, American Pragmatism: A
Religious Genealogy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), 25–39.
15J. P. N. Land, “Kant’s Space and Modern Mathematics,”
Mind (1877): 38–46.
16On the application of psychophysics to music, see
Alexandra Hui, The Psychophysical Ear: Musical
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In the context of music aesthetics, the pianist
and writer Adolf Kullak defined “general objec-
tivity” in 1856 as “the true, first, primitive factor
of music.”17 In practice this objectivity was
explicitly defined in relation to the sensorium;18
it referred first to what was rational in the organi-
zation of sound that differentiated musical com-
position from the disordered sounds of nature;
second, to the specifying factor in auditory sensa-
tions by which music could depict, or otherwise
objectify emotional states (in the spirit of Franz
Brendel’s future neudeutsche Schule, and not
unrelated to claims for program music: “to show
that truemusic suggests analogous ideas to differ-
ent minds,” in Baudelaire’s formulation):19
Here objectivity emerges in its most detailed form
within music. Whereas before, general impressions
of music on our inwardness, or the objectivity of
music in individual situations were abstractly pas-
sed over into appearance, now the tones’ expression
accompanies an objective course in its details, even
if this course consists purely in the subjective for-
mation of a soul-process, in a narration of objective
facts of greater or lesser use for our inwardness.20
If Kullak’s concept was defined in opposition to
an unruly human subject (“the objectivity
of subjectivity is the task of music”),21 a call to
uncover the hidden rationality of sensations
was later voiced by Gustav Engel, a Berlin-based
teacher of aesthetics and singing, who echoed
Helmholtz in declaring that music rests not on
caprice or blind necessity “but on the uncon-
scious operation of the same laws of reason that
are active in its later course.”22 The pinnacle of
aesthetic perception, for Engel-as-pedagogue,
was not understanding voice leading or poly-
phonic texture, chord progression, and modula-
tion, i.e., harnessing sensation to taste after
Baumgarten, rather “the ability to contemplate
the rational and, while giving ourselves over to
the full sensuous effect, to have a clear insight
into the inner web, into its coherence”23 (a view
oddly similar to Wordsworth on the aesthetic
appreciation of plant and animal anatomy).24
Certain theorists embraced a purely physical
origin of the sense of beauty,25 while for others
the answer lay in mathematics. It is indicative
of Engel’s desire for a numerate objectivity that
in a later article, entitled “A Mathematical-
Harmonic Analysis of Mozart’s Don Giovanni,”
he asked to what extentMozart’s opera remained
tonally unified when performed in just intona-
tion. By translating intervals into numerical
values and calculating the accumulation of pitch
discrepancies arising through tuning, he posited
corresponding adjustments during modulations
Experiments, Experimental Sounds, 1840–1910 (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).
17“Genau genommen ist die Objektivität in ihrer Allge-
meinheit der wahre, erste, primitive Factor der Tonkunst.”
Adolf Kullak, “Die Tonkunst und ihre Factoren. Zweiter
Abschnitt: Die allgemeine Objektivität,” Neue Zeitschrift für
Musik 45 (17 October 1856): 17–20, 169–74, 181–84, 193–98,
205–08, here 17 (17 October 1856): 169.
18“Die allgemeine Objectivität, ohne Hörbares gedacht,
würde zu unnatürlicher Abstraction verleiten.” Kullak,
“Die Tonkunst,” 169.
19Charles Baudelaire, SelectedWritings onArt and Literature,
trans. Patrice Édouard Charvet (London: Penguin, 1992), 330.
20“Die Objektivität tritt hier in ausführlichster Gestalt an die
Musik hervor; während vorher allgemeine Eindrücke dersel-
ben auf die Innerlichkeit, oder die Objectivität der letzteren
in einzelnen Situationen, abstract in die Erscheinung
übertrat, begleitet jetzt der Ausdruck der Töne einen objec-
tive Verlauf in seine Einzelheiten, sei es daß dieser Verlauf
rein in der subjectiven Gestaltung eines Seelenprocesses bes-
teht, der in einer Erzählung objective Thatsachen von
größerer oder geringerer Verwerthung für das Innerliche.”
Kullak, “Die Tonkunst,” Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 17
(17 October 1856): 174.
21“Also die Objektivität der Subjektivität ist die Aufgabe
der Tonkunst,” Kullak, “Die Tonkunst,” 172.
22“Sondern auf der unbewußten Thätigkeit derselben
Vernunftgesetze, welche in ihrem spätern Verlauf wirksam
sind.” Gustav Engel, Aesthetik der Tonkunst (Berlin:
Wilhelm Hertz, 1884), 37.
23“Wir [vermögen] das Vernünftige anzuschauen und,
indem wir uns der vollen sinnlichen Wirkung überlassen,
zugleich den klaren Einblick in das innere Gewebe, in
den Zusammenhang desselben.” Ibid.
24Wordsworth’s letter to Isabella Fenwick reads: “Some are
of the opinion that the habit of analyzing, decomposing,
and anatomizing is inevitably unfavourable to the percep-
tion of beauty . . . we are apt to ascribe to them that insen-
sibility of which they are in truth the effect and not the
cause . . . the beauty in form of a plant or an animal is
not made less but more apparent as a whole by more accu-
rate insight into its constituent properties and powers.”
Note to “This Lawn, a Carpet All Alive,” in The Poetical
Works of William Wordsworth, ed. de Selincourt (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1952–59), IV, 425.
25The Canadian writer Grant Allen (1848–99), for one, sets
out precisely this aim at the outset of his Physiological
Aesthetics: “to exhibit the purely physical origin of the
sense of beauty, and its relativity to our nervous organisa-
tion,” continuing that such a study is based on the assump-
tion that “all mental phenomena are the subjective sides of
what are objectively cognised as nervous functions.” Allen,
Physiological Aesthetics (New York: D. Appleton & Co.,
1877), 2.
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across the score to conclude that, remarkably,
Mozart had compensated for any discrepancy in
all but two numbers.26 Practicing musicians bal-
ked at such an enterprise, it seems, if also at the
mathematical signs densely strewn over sixty-
nine pages; Guido Adler, who edited the journal
in question, was pointedly mocked by Brahms
for going to press: “You call that scholarship?”27
More persuasive attempts to apply rational
properties to artistic perception, even to define a
science of beauty through principles that “are
universally felt to exist,” were certainly not
unprecedented.28 To take a final example, the
Scottish artist and writer David Ramsay Hay
published thirteen books on the topic between
1828 and 1856, ranging from The Laws of
Harmonious Colouring to The Science of
Beauty.29 Writing with architecture and visual
representation in mind, he argued that “the
Geometric principle of Beauty—proportion— . . .
is regulated by the harmonic ratios of numbers”
and pursued the corollary that shapes bearing
the same ratio may be mapped in infinite series,
ordered according to proportionality, which pro-
duced Hay’s unequivocal claim: “the beauty aris-
ing from the harmony of form may be, on all
occasions, with certainty produced.”30 His artis-
tic references ranged from Greek sculpture and
Pythagorean mathematics to units of color and
musical harmony; the latter resulted in a presen-
tation of the diatonic scale according to its ratios
of vibrations, between scale degrees and the tonic
(C), adjacent pitches, and the monochord’s
physical proportions. As plate 1 shows, Hay’s dia-
gram sought to translate the staff notation of a
scale into stacked, leaning columns of vibrational
ratios, encouraging readers to see a numerical
order behind the music notation. As though
unveiling a secret proof, he explains with bullish
confidence: “Thus the only kind of harmony . . .
which constitutes the beautiful in sound, owes
its excellence to an adherence to certain geomet-
rical rules, which act mechanically upon the
ears.”31 From this diatonic excess, Hay’s ideas
were sufficiently celebrated for The Anglo
American to describe him as “one of those men
who stand prominently out in front of his fel-
lows,” and to credit his writings with “the force
of original genius.”32 Yet the chasm between his
Plate 1: David Ramsey Hay, Geometric
Principle of Beauty Analysed (1843), 42.
26Engel, “Eine mathematisch-harmonisch Analyse des Don
Giovanni von Mozart,” Viertaljahrsschrift für Musikwissen-
schaft 3 (1887): 491–560.
27“‘Ist das Wissenschaft?’” Guido Adler, Wollen und
Wirken: Aus dem Leben eines Musikhistorikers (Vienna:
Universal-Edition, 1935), 32.
28David Ramsey Hay, Proportion, or the Geometric
Principle of Beauty Analysed (Edinburgh and London:
Blackwood and Sons, 1843), i.
29See Hay, The Laws of Harmonious Colouring (Edinburgh:
William and Robert Chambers, 1828), and The Science of
Beauty (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and
Sons, 1856). For a recent, discursive approach to Hay’s work,
see Benjamin Morgan, The Outward Mind: Materialist
Aesthetics in Victorian Science and Literature (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2017), 27–132.
30Hay, Proportion, 69–70. This bold statement heralds a
retreat, however, for Hay continues by concluding that
any application to the arts must be dealt with elsewhere,
that “it would be premature to apply rules until their accu-
racy were acknowledged.” Ibid., 70.
31Ibid., 43.
32Anon., “On Decorative Painting,” The Anglo American
4, no. 15 (1 February 1845): 357.
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platitudinous claim for harmony and themusical
praxis of a Brahms et al. remained.
While such acoustic knowledge was old,
Hay’s application of it to order ratios of geo-
metric figures was new, where rectangles were
formed through analogous properties: scale
degree = number of rectangle in a series; ratio
of pitch to the tonic = ratio of diagonals to the
right angle; vibrations per second = degrees in
diagonals. To illustrate the division of a quad-
rant by harmonic ratios, reproduced as plate 2,
Hay explains: the first is divided by 2, giving 45
degrees (the diagonal of the primary square) and
relating to the right angle as 1 to 2 (octave); the
second is divided by 3, giving a vertical diagonal
of the first oblong of 60 degrees, relating to the
right angle as 2 to 3 (perfect fifth); the third is
divided by 5, giving the vertical diagonal of the
second oblong of 72 degrees, relating to the right
angle as 4 to 5 (major third).33 The resulting
“comparative table” is given as plate 3, where
the reciprocity between “scales” of pitch and of
proportionally related rectangles appears self-
reinforcing; each confirmed by the other’s force
of beauty. Here, sound was being treated as an
interpretive key, an ordering function of nature
applied to visual forms (not unlike Kandinsky’s
later cultivation of a theory of color and form
through the idea of sonic vibrations).34
The recourse to mathematics in Hay and
Engel is indicative of the influence on aesthe-
tics of a professionalizing tendency within
the natural sciences, namely the tendency of
mid-century scientists to seek to control for
the fallibility of human observers, for the effects
of subjectivity on empirical observation. When
defined in opposition to a human subjectivity
(perhaps most ably defined by Coleridge),35 the
Plate 2: Hay’s illustrations of how a rectangle is divided according to harmonic divisions: 1:2, 2:3,
and 4:5, in Geometric Principle, 47.
33Hay, Proportion, 47.
34Wassily Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art
[1912], trans. M. T. H. Sadler (New York: Dover, 1977),
20ff.
35In 1817 Coleridge provided what would become the most
influential definition of an antithetical relation between
the terms subjective/objective: “Now the sum of all that
is merely OBJECTIVE, we will henceforth call NATURE,
confining the term to its passive and material sense, as
comparing all the phaenomena by which its existence is
made known to us. On the other hand, the sum of all that
is SUBJECTIVE, we may comprehend in the name of the
SELF or INTELLIGENCE. Both conceptions are in neces-
sary antithesis.” While this has been taken at face value
by some (e.g., Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison,
Objectivity [New York: Zone Books, 2007], 30), to regard
Coleridge’s terms as simple oppositional categories would
be reductive, for subjective being and objective phenomena
interpenetrate through the unifying activity of the imagi-
nation, which—for Coleridge—ultimately renders such cat-
egories not absolute. As he puts it: “In short, what I had
supposed substances were thinned away into shadow,
while everywhere shadows were deepened into substan-
ces,” continuing to cite Milton: “‘If substance may be
call’d what shadow seem’d, / For each seem’d either!’”
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concept of objectivity was underwritten by such
methods, and for this reason Lorraine Daston
and Peter Galison have persuasively argued that
“this form of scientific objectivity emerged only
in the mid nineteenth century.”36 Within the
now standardized scientific method of experi-
ment-observation, this entailed a reliance on
precision instruments and mathematical
modeling in the hope of achieving a mechani-
cal standard of objectivity, putatively devoid
of human bias.
Central to this debate in Great Britain was
John Herschel, celebrated mathematician and
astronomer, for whom number constituted both
a mathematical sign and “an object of sense,
because we can count,” i.e., it translated the
sensory and the symbolic directly into one
another to permit quantitative comparison by
the senses, a gesture that would presage both
Hay’s ratios and Helmholtz’s impulse to quantify
lawful behavior in the sensorium.37 Yet the reli-
ability of induction, from experimental data to
formulae, still depended on human observation
that—Herschel worried—may not include the
“whole scale of variation of which the quanti-
ties in question admit.”38 As Mary Poovey first
pointed out in her study of the institutionaliza-
tion of statistics during the 1830s,39 Herschel
did not try to solve this problem; rather he
named it:
Laws thus derived, by the direct process of including
in mathematical formulae the results of a greater or
less number of measurements, are called “empirical
laws.” . . . Empirical laws in this state are evidently
unverified inductions, and are to be received and
reasoned on with the utmost reserve. No confidence
can ever be placed in them beyond the limits of the
data from which they are derived; and even within
those limits they require a special and severe scru-
tiny to examine how nearly they do represent the
observed facts. . . . When empirical laws are unduly
relied on beyond the limits of the observations from
which they were deduced, there is no more fertile
source of fatal mistakes.40
The natural laws Helmholtz prophesied in 1878
as governing perception were thus empirical laws
in this sense. And the challenge of induction
remained. Like Herschel half a century earlier,
rather than “solving” it, he side-stepped it by
creating a new category. This time, by recourse
to the category of artistic perception.
Plate 3: Hay’s comparative table of geometric
properties and harmonic ratios, in
Geometric Principle, 50.
See Biographia Literaria, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson
Bate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 254–
55, and 301.
36See Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 42, 81–128.
37John Herschel, A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of
Natural Philosophy, ed. Arthur Fine (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1830), 124. The classic account of
Herschel’s status within Victorian science remains Walter
F. Cannon, “John Herschel and the Idea of Science,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 22 (1961): 215–39.
38Herschel, A Preliminary Discourse, 177.
39Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of
Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 321.
Poovey’s monograph traces historically the concept of the
“fact,” as unit of verifiable truth, to the practice of dou-
ble-entry bookkeeping, inaugurated in 1588.
40Herschel, Preliminary Discourse, 178.
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ROLE OF THE ARTIST
In fact, Helmholtz concluded his remarkable lec-
ture by figuring art as the ultimate evidence for
law-like perception. Works of art—the products
of human fingers and sweat, yet artificial by
definition—offered evidence of a lawlikeness
that is internal to what Helmholtz saw as the
closed semiotic scheme of human perception.
That is, the value of art had no reference to its
capacity to convey what is real in an external
world, instead it depended on the effect it had
on the collective judgment of witnesses. In this
reading, artistic creation becomes law-defining,
and might be considered a primary scientific
instinct, ultimately scrutable via the numerical
affinity of overtones and the ratio of forms, in
effect affirming a deep reciprocity between the
roles of scientific and artist.41 Helmholtz’s claim
is worth quoting at length:
The true researcher must always have something of
the artist’s insight. . . . Both artist and researcher
strive . . . towards the same goal: to discover new
lawfulness. . . . Both the true artist and the true
researcher know how to work properly and how to
give their work a stable form and convincing simili-
tude. . . . There occurs to us a number of cases which
show that certainty and rapidity of appearance of
certain ideas in the case of certain impressions can
also be achieved, even where nothing concerning
such a connection is given by name. One of the
most striking examples of this sort is the under-
standing of our mother-tongue. . . . It will not be
necessary for me to pile up examples of such pro-
cesses: daily life is rich enough with them. Art—
most obviously poetry and the fine arts—is virtually
grounded therein. . . . If the similar traces, which are
often left behind in our memories by repeated per-
ceptions, increase, then it is precisely the law-like
that repeats itself most regularly in a similar man-
ner, while fortuitous change is eliminated. By this
means there develops in the loving and attentive
observer an intuitive image of the typical behaviour
of the objects which interest him, of which he sub-
sequently knows just as little as to how it came
about as a child knows by which examples he has
learnt the meanings or words. That the artist has
beheld the real may be concluded from the fact that
when he brings before us an example cleansed of
accidental disturbances it again fills us with the con-
viction of truth. He is, however, superior to us in
that he knew how to sift out everything accidental
and confusing of the doings of the world.42
This veneration of artistic instinct was no
moment of weakness, a late-career concession
to the art and music Helmholtz had cultivated
in private and admired in public for six decades.
Fifteen years earlier, his treatise on the
Sensations of Tones (1863) had voiced precisely
the same supposition that “a germ of order”
slumbers in the “obscure depths” of a healthy
human mind, where “we learn to recognise and
admire in the work of art . . . the picture of a sim-
ilar arrangement of the universe, governed by
law and reason in all parts.”43 In this entwine-
ment, the cultural work imputed to art under-
writes the methods of empiricism. And the onus
of a lawlike reality is here restricted to what the
artist perceives, where art becomes the filter of
choice for determining unspecified lawlike
attributes of sensory perception, and for induc-
ing the resulting “empirical laws” in turn.
Cybernetically, this is a closed circuit of human
perception: objective to the extent its “laws” are
derived through collective empiricism, but still
with no claim for direct knowledge of a mind-
independent reality. It was a loud silence. As
Charles Sanders Peirce remarked in his obituary:
“It would seem that something must have hap-
pened [following the research on sensation from
the early 1850s] . . . whichmade Helmholtz dread
‘an sich’ as a burnt child does fire.”44
Here, finally, the objectivity of perception
splits into its constituent associations of the
lawlike behavior of sensations and the claim
that sense organs access a putative external
reality. Untangling these associations would
prove difficult during the 1850s–70s. Even
Helmholtz’s vocabulary spun the entwine-
ment tighter; he spoke of natural science esta-
blishing a ground on which to seek “the laws of
the real” where the law-like becomes “the
41This gesture of valorizing art builds on earlier lectures
that applied science—notably: optics and painting (1871),
harmony and music (1857)—and reflects a lifelong seat at
the piano. See Cahan, Helmholtz: A Life, 41–45.
42Helmholtz, “The Facts,” 354–55 (emphasis added).
43Helmholtz, Sensations of Tone, 366–67.
44Charles Sanders Peirce, “Helmholtz,” The Nation 59 (13
September 1894): 191–93, here 192.
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essential presumption for the character of the
real.”45 By proposing that what is real depended
on perceptual laws, Helmholtz’s lecture was
also responding to criticism. In 1877 Land—the
Dutch philosopher we encountered earlier—
had publicly cautioned Helmholtz that whoever
committed the “fundamental error” of straying
over the border between philosophy and physics
“shifts his problem as well as his method.” In
physics, he continued, “we must adopt a stan-
dard of truth, which in philosophy is the very
thing to be settled.”46 The thinking, imagining
perceiving subject of philosophy is not the same
as that of the man of science “fresh from the
physiology of the senses.” It was a direct
attack. Helmholtz—Land implied—is “unac-
customed to this kind of abstraction” and so
remains unaware “that he has crossed the fatal
border; and much of the reasoning current in
his own domain is no longer acceptable as law-
ful tender.” Specifically, the question came down
to whether, with sufficient accurate observations
and correct reasoning, physicists can regard the
result to be the “adequate expression of real exis-
tence”; Helmholtz did, but this is because “sci-
ence has no suspicion of a distinction between
‘objectivity’ and ‘reality’”:
The notions of “objectivity” and “reality,” hitherto
equivalent, must be carefully kept asunder, or else
it becomes impossible even to understand the ques-
tions at issue. We must be prepared to examine opi-
nions like these: that there is nothing real except
mind, whereas space and bodies are merely its object;
or, that besides mind there is a reality, impressing it
so as to produce an object wholly dissimilar from
the reality itself.47
This distinction, broached here in relation to the
perception of non-Euclidean sorts of space,
would shape epistemological discussion of
sound relentlessly. In passing, Helmholtz had
casually designated “objective light” as “vibra-
tions of the aether,” yet the corollary, objective
sound as oscillating compressions of a similarly
static medium, seemed less satisfactory, which
is to say: he left it unsaid.48 Given art’s new role
in determining laws of the real, and given
Helmholtz’s view that “music stands in a much
closer connection with pure sensation than any
of the other arts,”49 it is perhaps unsurprising
that a new question arose in this drive for objec-
tivity, namely: what was the “real” of sound?
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE REAL
In his monumental History of Materialism
(1865), Friedrich Albert Lange cited Helmholtz’s
study of vowel frequencies to bridge perception
and the putative reality of matter. Here, it is
sound that forms the interface: “The extension
of acoustics by the resolution of the vowels into
the effect of co-operating over-tones is at the
same time a complement of themechanical prin-
ciple of explaining nature. The sounds, as product
of a number of sensations of tone, still remains as
an effect of the movements of matter.”50 This
passing comment was in line with more strident
assertions frommaterialists like Büchner, that all
“imponderables,” i.e., light, sound, heat, electric-
ity, and magnetism, “are neither more nor less
than changes in the aggregate state of matter,”
i.e., referable to a theory of substance.51 Yet
Lange’s observation sets up a dead end: quite
how a unified idea, image or sound arises from
sensations that result from the variegated
“atomic”movements of matter—he continues—
is nothing short of a “metaphysical riddle,” a
synthesis that remains “inexplicable.”52
Running into this buffer (the problem of con-
sciousness) is one reason he characterized the
physiology of the sense organs as the field of
human inquiry in which the empirical method
had celebrated its highest triumph yet also
“leads us to the very limits of our knowledge,
and betrays to us at least so much of the sphere
beyond it as to convince us of its existence.”53
As an avowed Kantian, Lange’s second point
45Helmholtz, Sensations of Tone, 364, 362.
46J. P. N. Land, “Kant’s Space and Modern Mathematics,”
38.
47Ibid., 40, 41, 39–40.
48Helmholtz, “The Facts,” 345.
49Helmholtz, Sensations of Tone, 2.
50Friedrich Albert Lange, History of Materialism and
Criticism of Its Present Importance [1865], 3 vols., 2nd
edn. (London: Kegan Paul, 1925), III, 203 (emphasis added).
51Büchner, Force and Matter, 4.
52Lange, History of Materialism, 213.
53Ibid., 202.
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was significant. Historically, materialism posi-
tioned itself as the philosophy of the real.54
(For Büchner, famously, the “objective world”
was exclusively a world of force and matter.)55
Lange saw this as an irremediable weakness,
an act of intellectual stubbornness: the mind-
independent reality imagined by materialists
“does not exist and cannot exist.”56 As the ven-
erable physiologist Johannes Müller had shown
in his Elements of Physiology (1833–40), sen-
sory organs produced specific “sense energies,”
meaning that sunlight is perceived as light by
the eye, but heat by the skin. Sensory stimuli
were translations of mind-independent objects
according to the body’s cognitive and sensory
apparatus (“sense substances”); any stimulation
of the ear is felt as sound, of the eye, as light
and so on. An uncontroversial corollary—Lange
continues—would be that we experience effects
of objects rather than unaltered copies of objects:
“colours, sounds, smells etc. do not belong to
things in themselves, but . . . are peculiar forms
of excitation of our sensibility, which are called
forth by corresponding but qualitatively very dif-
ferent phenomena in the outer world.”57 Visual
examples of modified sensory effects, including
the inverted image projected onto the retina,
and the brain’s imperfect compensation for the
blindspot, generated only affirmations that sen-
sory stimuli offer no route to the “real” as such.
“Must we not conclude,” he asks, “that the
passage of the effects of a thing-in-itself into
the medium of our being probably also invol-
ves important, perhaps incomparably more
important, modifications?”58 The conscious
experience of perception might be lawlike, in
other words, but it does not follow that what
is perceived is real in the manner Helmholtz
suggested (cf. Land). Building on Müller’s episte-
mological insight, Lange proceeded to strike at
the heart of the physicalist doctrine of material-
ism with the view that even if we assume the
presence of lawlike physical mechanismswithin
the body (mechanisms that produce mental
“conclusions” arising from sensations), wemust
then ask: “What is the Body? What is Matter?
What is the Physical? And modern physiology,
just as much as philosophy, must answer that
they are all only our ideas; . . . ideas resulting
according to natural laws, but still never the
things themselves.”Matter itself, on such terms,
becomes “a factitious principle” and so a “con-
sistently materialist view” is revealed to be
nothing but “a consistently idealistic view.”59
Perhaps the dance between perception and
matter was all merely a closed loop, a recursive
causality of thought.
This moment of reckoning may seem logi-
cal, and as a skewer for materialism it would
prevail within the history of philosophy. But
in the same decade, several commentators,
including prominent materialists, argued
precisely the opposite: that objects of sense—
including sound—were real, knowable physi-
cal entities. A contemporary case is Heinrich
Czolbe, perhaps the most fanatical academic
physician of the nineteenth century to pursue
a worldview exclusively through the principle
of sensation. Czolbe’s Neue Darstellung des
Sensualismus (1855) explained the doctrine of
what he called sensualism (Sensualismus), a
monist stance that defined reality at the level
of sensation and so excluded as unreal every-
thing that is “supersensible,” i.e., what could
not be sensed or experienced. In this way, all
concepts would attain precise meaning by
becoming intuited via experience. It was a
form of naïve realism through which he hoped
to establish a more principled, systematic
foundation for materialism than the fragmen-
ted arguments advanced hitherto.60
54Compare Lange, History of Materialism, 335ff.
55Büchner, Force and Matter, 174.
56Lange, History of Materialism, 336.
57Ibid., 217.
58Ibid., 226.
59Ibid., 215, 223 (emphasis added).
60In this enterprise he failed, when a number of public cri-
ticisms by Rudolf Herrmann Lotze found no answer.
Beyond the argument that sense energies remained
unchanged, morphologically, in their passage from the
external world to the nervous system, the Lockean proposi-
tion that thought was explicable physiologically, deter-
mined by laws of association, was criticized by Lotze for
failing to acknowledge the material of intuition and the
unity of consciousness, neither of which can be demon-
strated by empiricism. Czolbe responded first with a leng-
thy rebuttal (Entstehung des Selbstbewußtseins: Eine
Antwort an Herrn Professor Lotze [Leipzig: Costenoble,
1856]). This again was reviewed by Lotze (“Recension von
Heinrich Czolbe, Entsteung des Selbstebewußtseins. Eine
Antwort an Herrn Professor Lotze,” Göttingen gelehrte
Anzeigen 32 [1857]: 313–20), but in 1865 he relinquished
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Significantly, for present purposes, he argued
the effects of stimuli are propagated mechani-
cally in precisely the form in which they are
created and received, i.e., they remain unchan-
ged; hence the quality of sound (or color, or
heat) is somehow inherent in the very form of
its propagation along nerves and through the
atmosphere.61 This argument held that sensory
qualities are fully present and fully formed as
they shift from external stimuli to internal expe-
rience. Where sensation stimulates imagination
indirectly, as in the case of music that might
prompt us to think of images or colors, this steer
becomes a determinate process; for Czolbe:
“the length or speed of [vibratory] movement
must be the same in the imagination as in
perception.”62
Returning briefly to aesthetics, two essays on
the new sensory experience of Richard Wagner’s
Romantic operas frame the publication of
Czolbe’s theory and are arguably substantiated
by the principles it claims to advance. Both
Franz Liszt (1852) and Charles Baudelaire (1861)
invoke an audiovisual sense acuity when dis-
cussing the Prelude to Lohengrin in which liste-
ners seemingly experience the presence of light,
space, and iridescent color, distantly reflecting
associations of the Holy Grail, through the high
frequencies of the opening upper strings. For
Liszt:
Wagner . . . displays to our gaze the dazzling temple
built of incorruptible woods, whose walls are sweet-
smelling, and doors of gold, whose lintels are of
greenish chysolite, whose columns are of opals and
partitions of cymophane. . . . Not in its imposing
structural reality, but as if sparing the weakness of
our senses, he shows it to us first reflected in blue
waters or shimmering as though in an iridescent
haze. . . . The trumpets and trombones . . . repeat
the melody for the fourth time with a dazzling bril-
liancy of coloring, as if at this very instant the sacred
edifice shone forth before our astonished gaze in all
its luminous and radiant magnificence. But its
bright sparkling, increased by degrees to an intensity
equaling the brilliancy of the sun, suddenly goes out
like a heavenly meteor. The transparent mist of the
clouds shuts it in again, the vision disappears by
degrees in the same variegated fragrance, in the
midst of which it first appeared.63
A year later, Wagner described his own vision of
the Grail’s passage from heaven to earth in simi-
lar terms:
At the beginning, the clearest blue air of Heaven
seems to condense into a mysterious vision, barely
perceptible by the eye of utmost unearthly yearning,
yet holding the enraptured gaze with a magic spell;
in infinitely soft, but ever more distinct outline
appears the wonder-bringing host of angels, descend-
ing imperceptibly from ethereal heights, and bearing
in its midst the sacred vessel. As the vision becomes
ever mode discernable and apparent, and hovers
down towards this vale of Earth, the sweetest fra-
grance wafts out from its wings: entrancing vapors
stream from it in clouds of gold.64
his claim that materialism could explain the phenomenon
of consciousness (Die Grenzen und der Urspeung der
menschlichen Erkenntnis im Gegensatz zu Kant und Hegel
[Leipzig: Costenoble, 1865]). The full episode is summarized
in Frederick C. Beiser, Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg
& Lotze (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 243–47.
61Heinrich Czolbe, Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus:
Ein Entwurf (Leipzig: Hermann Costenoble, 1855), 13–14.
62Ibid., 46.
63“Wagner . . . il fait miroiter à nos yeux ce temple de bois
incorruptible, aux murs odorans, aux portes d’or, aux solives
d’asbeste, aux colonnes d’opales, aux ogives d’onyx, aux par-
vis de cymophane. . . . Il ne nous le fait point appercevoir,
dans son imposante et réelle structure, mais comme
ménageant nos faibles sens, il nous le montre d’abord
refleté dans quelque onde azurée, ou reproduit par quelque
nuage irisé . . . l’entrée des trompettes et des trombones, qui
répètent la mélodie pour la quatrième fois, avec un éclat
éblouissant de coloris, comme si dans cet instant unique
l’édifice saint avait brillé devant nos regards aveuglés, dans
toute sa magnificence lumineuse et radiante. Mais lé vif
étincellement amené par degrés à cette intensité de rayonne-
ment solaire, s’éteint avec rapidité, comme une lueur céleste.
La transparente vapeur des nuées se referme, la vision
disparanît peu à peu dans le même encens diapré, au milieu
duquel elle est apparue.” Liszt, “Lohengrin: Grand opera
romantique de R. Wagner,” Sämtliche Schriften, 9 vols.
(planned), ed. Rainer Kleinertz and Detlef Altenburg
(Wiesbaden: Breitkopf and Härtel, 1989), IV, 32.
64“Dem verzückten Blicke höchster, überirdischer
Liebessehnsucht scheint im Beginne sich der klarste blaue
Himmelsäther zu einer wundervollen, kaum wahrnehm-
baren, und doch das Gesicht zauberhaft einnehmenden
Erscheinung zu verdichten; in unendlich zarten Linien
zeichnet sich mit allmählich wachsender Bestimmtheit die
wunderspendende Engelschar ab, die, in ihrer Mitte das hei-
lige Gefäß geleitend, aus lichten Höhen unmerklich sich
herabsenkt. Wie die erscheinung immer deutlicher isch
kundgibt und immer ersichtlicher dem Erdentale zuschwebt,
ergießen sich berauschend süße Düfte aus ihrem Schoße:
entzückende Düfte wallen aus ihr wie goldenes Gewölk her-
nieder.” Wagner, “Vorspiel zu Lohengrin” [1853], Sämtliche
Schriften und Dichtungen, ed. Richard Linnemann, 12 vols.
(Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1911), V, 180.
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For his part, Baudelaire recorded his own experi-
ence of listening to the Prelude and proceeds to
marvel at the commonality between his,
Wagner’s, and Liszt’s visions:
Soon I became aware of a heightened brightness, of a
light growing in intensity so quickly that the shades
of meaning provided by the dictionary would not
suffice to express this constant increase of burning
whiteness. Then I achieved a full apprehension of a
soul floating in light, of an ecstasy compounded of
joy and insight, hovering above and far removed from
the natural world. . . . Even if the [similarities between
visions of the music] were few in number, they would
still be proof enough, but by good fortune they are
superabundant and striking even to excess.65
If we take the three authors at their word, these
accounts may be read as a kind of knowing
through sound, an acoustemology (“acoustic
epistemology”), in which perceiving the Holy
Grail—metonym for the opera’s subject, a
medieval Grail knight—becomes almost tactile,
a matter of sensory perception in the same way
that, for Czolbe, not only is vibratorymovement
identical in perception and imagination, but
even abstractions such as metaphor or mathe-
matical axioms are sensory perceptions.66
More traditionally, we might read such liter-
ary reactions in terms of a discourse network,
perhaps simply a trope that alloys dazzling, bril-
liant whiteness to the Holy Grail. Witness
Tennyson’s “Sir Galahad” (1834), whose vision
is prompted by a sound:
A gentle sound, an awful light!
Three angels bear the Holy Grail,
With folded feet in stoles of white.
If Czolbe’s pseudoscientific coupling between
narrative and sensation ultimately invites skep-
ticism (his theories were publicly denounced by
R. H. Lotze, eventually leading to a retraction),67
a later, steadfast advocate of what was termed
a “substantialist” theory of sound positively
anticipated readers’ disbelief: “I am well aware
that [refuting the theory of sound after
Helmholtz and Tyndall] . . . will naturally
awaken in the scientific mind a feeling of con-
tempt for its author, mingled perhaps with
commiseration.”68 Alexander Wilford Hall, a
Methodist minister in New York and editor
of two scientific journals on the margins of
respectability, argued that sound was an imma-
terial substance, similar to odor. All so-called
forces—light, heat, gravity, sound, magnetism—
are substances made of smaller particles than
“material” substances. To talk of essential dif-
ferences between the nature of material and
immaterial substances would be “irrational,
as well as unnecessary,” he explains.69 With
pugnacious, driving prose, his popular book
on science, The Problem of Human Life (1877),
took aim at Darwinian evolution, but along
the way reproached prevailing theories of
sound, arguing against a theory of wavemotion
(“purely visionary . . . a pure fallacy of sci-
ence”). He claimed that sound is “a finely
attenuated substance, which is radiated from
the sound-producing body by an unknown law
of diffusion” where “corpuscular emissions”
are radiated “in sonorous pulses or discharges,
instead of continuous streams, each discharge
synchronising with the vibratory movement of
the string.”70 It was a striking regression to pre-
Newtonian theories of sense substances that
underscored the residual ambiguity of sound
beyond university-based physics.71
In particular, the assumption that undulating
waves pass seamlessly through successive media
65Baudelaire, “Richard Wagner and Tannhäuser in Paris,”
Selected Writings on Art and Literature (London: Penguin
1972), 329–30.
66“[DieMathematik] isteineabstrakteWissenschaft, dasievon
den Qualitäten der Körper abstrahirt, ihr Gegenstand ist aber
entschieden sinnlich, oder anschaulich. Die mathematischen
Axiome sind nichts anderes, als sinnliche Wahrnehmungen.”
Czolbe,NeueDarstellung, 39.
67For Czolbe and Lotze, see n. 60.
68Hall, The Problem of Human Life, 75.
69Ibid., 33.
70Ibid., 76–77.
71In prefacing his assault on contemporary physics, Hall
pointed out that he was less severe against scientific
authority than Thomas Edison, who is cited thus: “There
are more frauds in science than any where else. . . . Take
a whole pile of them that I can name and you will find
uncertainty if not imposition in half of what they state as
scientific truth. . . . Professor this or that will controvert
you out of the books, and prove out of the books that it
can’t be so, though you have it right in the hollow of your
hand all the time and could break his spectacles with it.”
See Hall, The Problem of Human Life, viii.
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left Hall incredulous, for they “must travel undis-
torted the entire distance the sound is heard.”72
Back in 1830, Herschel had clarified that, with
sound, it was “not a case of the propagation of
motion at all.”Rather, every particle of amedium
“receives itswholemotion fromthosewhichwere
moving before, and transmits it to others previ-
ously at rest. . . . Sounds transmitted through a
smoky or dusty atmosphere cause no visible
motion in the smoke or floating dust.”73 His anal-
ogyofchoicewasabreezepassingthroughafieldof
corn, successivelybendingpliable ears of corn into
motionbeforeeachspringsbackandreturns to sta-
sis. In its reception,Herschel’s ideapromptedclari-
fications over “what it really is that passes from
one point to another, whenwe say sound is trans-
mitted.” Neither sensation nor any “absolute
thing” is transmitted, explained Alexander Ellis
in 1845, but “a certain state of the [static] particles
of the atmosphere.”74
Hall’s fallacies are perhaps less important than
his firm belief in a sound material, a physical
matter of sound beyond the reach of empirical
understanding, extant not in the mind but as
immaterial substance: a glorious oxymoron.75
He had overturned modern physics, in part, to
demonstrate the plausibility of a soul similarly
constituted of “immaterial substance,” and
thereby to refute the atheistic consequences of
materialism. On the one hand, sound substance
might therefore be dismissed simply as a neces-
sary corollary in this scheme. On the other hand,
the book seeminglywent through twenty editions
(self-published) in three years, with Chicago’s
Inter Ocean crediting it as “strong in ‘horse’
sense”—aka common sense—through “the clea-
rest, keenest,most scholarlywriting,”while offer-
ing “the most complete refutation of Darwinism,
Huxleyism and their class which we have any-
wheremet.”76 It even spawned a high-school text-
book on “substantial” acoustics.77 Here an
appetite for the semi-imaginary stands apart from
the more prudent thinkers who pointedly refused
to engage Hall despite his provocations.78
When abstracted from its religious motiva-
tions, the claim for a tangible sound substance
is only a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that
objects of perception were directly passed in pro-
portionate form from external stimulus to men-
tal representation (cf. Czolbe). This latter claim
was more common among respected scientists.
It implied, paceKant, thatwe do have knowledge
of a “real” external world through our senses.
Büchner, for one, advocated as much, where sen-
sorymechanisms convey external impressions to
a brain that “receives, digests, and reproduces
them.” The result, he continues, is our creation
of an “internal picture of the external world.”79
Just as Lange acknowledged that a sphere beyond
the limits of our knowledge is “betrayed” by our
sensations, the youngHelmholtz brushed against
the materialist argument in oddly similar terms
in his lecture on human vision from 1855:
In what way, then, did we first emerge from the
world of nervous sensation into the world of reality?
Obviously only by virtue of an inference: we must
presuppose the presence of external objects as the
cause of our nerves’ stimulation, for there can be
no effect without cause. . . . We see now that we
need this principle before we have any kind of
knowledge of things in the external world. We need
it simply in order to realise that objects exist in
72Ibid., 77.
73John Herschel, “Sound,” Encyclopaedia Metropolitana,
vol. IV (London: B. Fellowes, 1830), 747–824, here 756–57.
74Alexander John Ellis, The Alphabet of Nature: Or,
contributions Towards a More Accurate Analyses and
Symbolization of Spoken Sounds (London: S. Bagster;
Bath: I. Pitman, 1845), 9.
75Among Hall’s numerous arguments against wave theory is
the claim that a piano’s fixed sound board can only amplify
a single pitch because it exhibits a “molecular tremor”
rather than vibrations, where the wave-theory must assume
a capability for “no less than eighty-five separate systems
of air waves.” Hall, The Problem of Human Life, 84–85.
The only comprehensive tract discrediting Hall’s work was
by a Michigan-based Professor of Physics, John A. Graves,
Substantialism: The Philosophy of A. Wilford Hall
Examined (Washington DC: Terry Bros., 1891).
76The Daily Inter Ocean, no. 49 (Saturday 21 May 1881): 11.
77John I. Swander and Alexander Wilford Hall, A Text-Book
on Sound: The Substantial Theory of Acoustics Adapted to
the Use of Schools, Colleges etc. (New York: Hall & Co.,
1887).
78This included numerous articles in the journals Hall edited,
Microcosm and The Scientific Arena, and well as moments of
heightened rhetoric in The Problem of Human Life at appar-
ent contradictions in scientist’s reasoning (e.g., John Tyndall
on the capacity of the piano’s sound board to vibrate simulta-
neously at different frequencies), and a full-page portrait
gallery of the six scientists whose theories he sought to over-
turn. See The Problem, 84–87.
79Büchner, Force and Matter, 162, 166.
DAVID
TRIPPETT
Sound as
Hermeneutic
111
space around us, between which a relation of cause
and effect can exist.80
This reference to knowledge of “things in the
externalworld” (i.e., amind-independent reality)
has led some to align Helmholtz with Büchner
during this period, accepting the intuitions of
causality and spatiality that, for sensation,
Helmholtz felt needed to be treated as a priori.81
But even the space in which we presume sound
and light to move “is called [space] only by cour-
tesy,” as Land had reminded Helmholtz, i.e., we
all had to learn to conceive of objective space as
something in which bodies are able to move.82
Prompted by Hall’s polemic, a related ques-
tion would be: on what terms does scrutiny of
the perception of sound constitute scrutiny of
the “real” of sound? The assumption underlying
such a question, that sound only becomes such
when striking a human ear, is here laid bare as
a form of “anthropic bias,” i.e., a filtering effect
for data limited not only by the particular affor-
dances of measuring instruments and search
methods used, but also “by the precondition that
somebody be there to ‘have’ the data yielded by
the instruments and to build the instruments
in the first place.”83 At a minimum, it marks
claims for the real as contingent on more than
spatiality and causality. And what is consistent
in the scientific and pseudo-scientific accounts
above is a recursive interest in sound: as meta-
phor, object, inspiration, means of knowing.
As mooted earlier, sound became a prism
through which to explore precisely this ambigu-
ity over matter in the second half of the century.
Sound was intangible, untouchable, and—as a
medium—reveals the ontological indiscernibi-
lity of medium and world. In the wake of the
Jena Romantics, it also co-opted the human sub-
ject by unveiling a natural language of feelings.
Recall that, from the earliest decades of the cen-
tury, it became attractive as the complement for
a Romantic metaphysics rooted in the ideal.
“We cannot accept sounds as constituent of the
physical world interpreted by the sense of sight
and of touch,” Christian Friedrich Michaelis
had argued in 1806. “Sounds are to a certain
extent un-physical, although they originate from
bodies in motion; and just as spiritual things are
invisible, so too are sounds.”84 Acoustic sound is
also quintessentially impermanent; as Hegel
famously put it, sound disappears by being.85
The following case study offers some perspective
on how this ambiguity over the object of sound
played out within the epistemological debates
outlined above, and how it helped establish
sound’s role as a hermeneutic within contempo-
rary scientific culture. A hermeneutic that in
turn would make Helmholtz’s later claim possi-
ble that it is the artist who had “beheld the real.”
80“Auf welche Weise sind wir denn nun zuerst aus der
Welt der Empfundungen unserer Nerven hinübergelangt
in die Welt der Wirklichkeit? Offenbar nur durch einen
Schluss; wir müssen die Gegenwart äusserer Objecte als
Ursache unserer Nervenerregung voraussetzen; den es
kann keine Wirkung ohne Ursache sein. . . . [A]ber wie
man sieht, brauchen wir diesen Satz, ehe wir noch irgend
eine Kenntniss von den Dingen der Aussenwelt haben;
wir brauchen ihn, um nur überhaupt zu der Erkenntniss
zu kommen, dass Objecte im Raume um un giebt, zwi-
schen denen ein Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung
bestehen kann.” Helmholtz, Vorträge und Reden, vol. 1,
4th edn. (Brunswick: Friedrich Vieweg & Sohn, 1896),
115–16. See also Patrick J. MacDonald, “Helmholtz’s
Metholology of Sensory Science, the Zeichentheorie, and
Physical Models of Hearing Mechanisms,” in History of
Philosophy of Science: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook,
ed. M. Heidelberger and F. Stadler (Dordrecht: Springer,
2001), IX, 159–83; and Michael Friedman, “Helmholtz’s
Zeichentheorie and Schlick’s Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre:
Early Logical Empiricism and Its Nineteenth-Century
Background,” Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 19–50.
81The apparent dovetailing of concept with Büchner was suf-
ficient for Scott Edgar to argue that Büchner and Helmholtz
“agree that the content of our objective knowledge consists
in images that resemble spatially-arrayed matter and causal
forces in the external world.” Scott Edgar, “The Physiology
of the Sense Organs and Early Neo-Kantian Conceptions of
Objectivity: Helmholtz, Lange, Liebmann,” Objectivity in
Science, ed. Flavia Padovani, Alan Richardson, Jonathan Y.
Tau (Heidelberg: Springer, 2015), 103.
82Land, “Kant’s Space and Modern Mathematics,” 42.
83Nick Bostrom, Anthropic Bias: Observation and Selection
Effects in Science and Philosophy (New York: Routledge,
2002), 2.
84“Wir können sie nicht als Bestandtheile der Körperwelt gel-
ten lassen, für welche das Gesicht und der Betastungssinn
zeugt. Die Töne sind insofern etwas Unkörperliches, ob sie
gleich durch gewegte Körper entstehen; mit dem Geistigen
haben wie wenigstens das Unsichtbare gemein.” Christian
Friedrich Michaelis, “Ein Versuch, des innere Wesen der
Tonkunst zu entwickeln,” Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung
9, no. 43 (23 July 1806): 674 (emphasis added).
85G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 2 vols.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), II, 905.
19TH
CENTURY
MUSIC
112
ANTOINE JOBERT AND THE UNSOUND WAGER
In 1850 a wager was struck between an English
philosopher in London’s leafy Hyde Park,
Thomas Simon, and a French geologist living in
Manchester, Antoine Jobert: for Jobert to prove
that sounds “are not pure sensations.” The sum
of £500 (£66,119 / $87,386 in 2019)86 was offered
as reward by Simon with no penalty for failure,
and the challenge duly taken up. A short book
records the correspondence, arguments, and
result. If the individuals are otherwise undistin-
guished, historically speaking, their interaction
is emblematic of how sonic ambiguity informed
wider debate. A summary of the episode runs as
follows.87
In 1847 Mr. Simon anonymously authored a
monograph, Universal Immaterialism, and had
sought to stoke debate by issuing an uncommon
challenge: “A prize of one hundred pounds for a
conclusive disproof of Universal Immaterialism”
to be presented within twelve months of publi-
cation.88 Simon’s book resurrected George
Berkeley’s philosophy for the mid-nineteenth
century, and after his challenge attracted no
interlocutors, he solicited first a public discus-
sion with Jobert, who had commented upon
the book in passing, then a wager in which
sound should serve as the central object:
Make a statement of your argument upon SOUND, in
a pamphlet not exceeding sixteen octavo pages, in clear
print, at your own expense, and publish it, sending me
three copies. Let us then submit these arguments to six
umpires, three of whom shall be chosen by you, and
three by me (but I approving of your choice and you
of mine). Then if these six gentlemen admit that you
have proved sounds not to be pure sensations, I am
ready to pledge myself to pay you £500 at once, you
incurring no risk whatever, except the expense of a
little pamphlet, which ought to be as short as possible,
not to give the umpires unnecessary trouble.89
In accepting the wager, Jobert clarified the chal-
lenge in a tenuous syllogism drawn from their
correspondence. It points to nothing less than
the substance of the universe, pointedly failing
to delimit the scope:
1. Sounds are pure sensations;
2. There are vibrations of a medium which are
not sounds, but the cause of sounds;
3. Therefore it is physically impossible that
there should be a material substance in our
universe.90
Initially, the proposition that sounds are pure sen-
sations hinged on the question of definition: if
“sound” was not the physical vibrations that
cause the sensory experience of sound for humans
(2), it must be the sensory experience itself (1).
Jobert’s sample of contemporary definitions,
given in Table 1, offered little consensus except
to deny Simon’s claim that “what unscientific
people call sound” is pure sensation. He con-
cluded the first portion of his argument by
claiming that if “sound” only means the sensa-
tions of sound produced in a listener, then the
proposition was circular: it “has no more
meaning than the affirmation that ‘the sensa-
tion of sound is a pure sensation.’”91 As such,
it could easily be laughed off.
Beneath the syntactical surface, however,
Simon had argued that sound as such has no
physical existence in the external world: “every
sound in the universe subsists spiritually, and
can only so subsist . . . thunder, for instance, is
a thing solely within the mind.”92 Beyond the
question of definition, this appears to have been
an imperfect extrapolation fromMüller’s insight
that what is perceived by the sensorium, via the
medium of our senses, “is indeed merely a prop-
erty or change of condition of our nerves,” i.e.,
the experience of sensation and sense modality
is determined by the architecture of our nervous
86Sums calculated using the Bank of England’s online infla-
tion calculator: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mone
tary-policy/inflation/inflation-calculator.
87Antoine Claude Gabriel Jobert, Pure Sounds against Pure
Immaterialism; or, That Sounds Are Not Pure Sensations
(London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co., 1850); a second edi-
tion was published in 1851 containing “new arguments
and general conclusions” in an additional chapter.
88Anon. [Timothy Collyns Simon], On the Nature and Ele-
ments of the External World: or Universal Immaterialism,
Fully Explained and Newly Demonstrated (London: John
Churchill, 1847), frontmatter.
89Simon to Jobert, ca. December 1849, cited in Jobert, Pure
Sounds, 5.
90Jobert, Pure Sounds, 6.
91Ibid., 13.
92Simon, On the Nature and Elements of the External
World, or Universal Immaterialism, 97.
DAVID
TRIPPETT
Sound as
Hermeneutic
113
system.93 In other words, Müller’s profoundly
physiological insight was here enlisted to
support the most abstract of philosophical pro-
positions: an immaterial world. That Müller
himself added a caveat that “imagination and
reason stand ready to interpret themodifications
in the state of the nerves”was simply evidence—
for Jobert—that metaphysics had continued
unduly to influence Müller’s thought.94
Müller’s basic insight concerning sound had
been parroted by a range of scientific figures,
including the botanist and cell biologist Matthias
Schleiden, who worked in Müller’s lab in Berlin
before being appointed at Jena. Schleiden’s vale-
dictory Studien included the statement: “If a
sound exists neither in the external world nor
in those parts of our nervous system that are just
Table 1
The Motley Definitions of Sounds Cited in Jobert’s Pure Sounds Against Pure Immaterialism
(London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1850), 10−11.
Unscientific Definitions of Sound ca. 1850
JOBERT’S REFERENCE DEFINITION
Johnson’s Pocket Dictionary “Sound, anything audible”1
Walker’s Dictionary “Sound, that which is perceived by the ear”2
Bailey’s Dictionary “Sound, the object of hearing”3
Boyer’s Dictionnaire “Son, ce qui frappe l’ouïe”4
Boiste’s Dictionnaire “Son, vibration des corps sonores”5
Rider’s Dictionary “Sound, a perception raised in the soul by means of air
put in motion and vibrating on the drum of the ear”6
Blackie’s Imperial Dictionary “Sound, the object of hearing; that which strikes the
ear, or, more philosophically, an impression, or the
effect of an impression, made on the organs of hearing
by the vibrations of the air, &c”7
Encyclopaedia Britannica “Sound arises from a sort of concussion or agitation
which takes places amongst the bodies from which the
sound is emitted. . . . It is transmitted through the
medium of the surrounding air.”8
1Published in multiple editions in the wake of Samuel Johnson’s 1755 Dictionary of the English Language.
2John Walker, The Critical Pronouncing Dictionary (1st edn. 1775) was later retitled, The Rhyming Dictionary,
on account of words being grouped, not phonetically, but alphabetically in accordance with the reversed
spelling of the word.
3Nathan Bailey, Dictionarium Britannicum (1st edn. 1730).
4Abel Boyer, Dictionnaire royal français et anglais, divisé en deux parties (1st edn. 1702).
5Pierre Claude Victor Boiste, Dictionnaire universel de la langue française (1st edn. 1800).
6Bishop John Rider, Bibliotheca Scholastica, a Double Dictionarie (1st edn. 1589); this was known in the early
seventeenth century as Rider’s Dictionary, in an edition augmented by Francis Holyoke.
7Reverend John Ogilvie, The Imperial Dictionary of the English Language: A Complete Encyclopedic Lexicon,
Literary, Scientific, and Technological, 2 vols. (1st edn. 1847–50).
8Encyclopaedia Britannica, 7th edn. (1830), entry on “Acoustics.”
93Cited in Jobert (1851), Pure Sounds, 41. See also Johannes
Müller, Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen (Coblenz:
J. Hölscher, 1834–40); English trans. William Baly, Elements
of Physiology (London: Taylor and Walton, 1838–42). 94Jobert (1851), Pure Sounds, 41.
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as external to our actual self, our soul, as the
most distant star, it follows that a sound is noth-
ing but the way our mind perceives certain
states of the nervous system.”95 This formula-
tion persuaded Kullak, for whom there “is
something true in Schleiden’s adage. . . .
Every physicist knows quite well that sound
[Ton] is objectively something else.”96
Ostensibly, the debate begged the question of
the independent existence of sounds, but the
ramifications were more widely understood.
Sound—invisible, tactile, acting on objects at a
distance—was openly serving as a microcosm
for the broader clash between material and
immaterial existence. In the context of a
Romantic aesthetics, Schleiden attributed deep-
rooted connections between sound and the
imagination (Phantasie) simply to the impreci-
sion of our spatial hearing, which implied a feed-
back loop between mental abstraction and the
approximate discernment of a sound source’s
location, i.e., a lack of precise information
drove the impulse toward abstraction.97 It is
telling for the wider controversies implied that
although the one matter Jobert and Simon
agreed upon gestured in this direction—“what
is true of sounds is true of the effect upon our
four other senses”98—neither felt able to relin-
quish the focus on sound and the sensorium.
As an unstable object and an intellectual prism,
it had become a necessary rhetorical limit.
THE LAST GNAT
The second main plank of Jobert’s argument
against the proposition that sound is pure
sensation is the so-called last gnat thesis. Again
he summarizes the challenge with a syllogism:
1. [sounds] are sensations and therefore subsist
only within the substance of our minds;
2. Our senses teach us that the [sounds of
sonorous bodies] are identically in the same
place in which the sonorous bodies
themselves are;
3. Therefore all [sonorous bodies] in the
universe subsist only within the substance
of our minds.99
For Jobert, this renders sound mind-dependent,
and his rebuttal first observes that if all human
life were wiped out, animal hearing would
endure; second, that even if the “last gnat”were
crushed by an errant stone, or:
the whole population of the earth was suddenly
destroyed by a great natural catastrophe, still the
stormy waves of the sea rushing upon the cliffs of
its shore, and the tempestuous winds sweeping over
the surface of dear continents would rend the air
with their usual conflict of disorderly noises and
sounds. / SOUNDS, THEREFORE, ARE NOT
PURE SENSATIONS.100
Physical vibration and mechanical compres-
sions would subsist, in other words, but whether
this constituted sound remained an unprovable
hypothesis; no human, Jobert included, could
demonstrate positively the existence of sound
as amind-independent object (cf. anthropic bias).
As an aside, Aristotle’s distinction between
potential and actual sensory properties might
have offered some clarity here; stormy waves in
the absence of listening ears have the potential
to be heard as sound, even if they are not actually
heard, just as a “sounding thing” has the poten-
tial to be heard when struck, even while it is
silent.101 But this distinction operates at the
level of logic, and it is perhaps unsurprising that
a geologist should oppose a philosopher on this
topic: the one deals ultimately in the dusty, solid
matter underfoot, the other in degrees of mental
95“Gibt es also einen Ton weder in der Außenwelt, noch in
den Theilen unseres Nervensystems, die im Grunde für
unser eigentliches Ich, unsere Seele, ebenso äußerlich sind
als der fernste Stern, so folgt daraus, daß der Ton nichts
Anderes ist, als die Art und Weise, wie unser geistiges Ich
gewisse Zustände unseres Nervensystems zur Vorstellung
bringt.” Schleiden’s Studien, 2nd edn. (1857), 100. [https://
reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb101
35778_00021.html?zoom=0.6500000000000001].
96Kullak, Die Tonkunst und ihre factoren, 171.
97“Diese räumliche Unbestimmtheit der Gehörserschein-
nungen trägt wesentlich mit dazu bei, daß dieselben einen
so auffallenden Einfluß auf die Belebung der Phantasie
ausüben.” Schleiden’s Studien, 97.
98Jobert, Pure Sounds, 10.
99Ibid., 14.
100Ibid., 19.
101In his chapter on listening, he famously asserts at the out-
set: “Now sound is in two ways, one in actuality, the other
in potentiality.” Aristotle, De Anima, trans. Hugh Lawson-
Tancred (London: Penguin, 1986), 176.
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abstraction. Jobert had sought amiddleground in
his ambitiously titled Philosophy of Geology
(1846) and by 1850, his primary training steered
the argument about sound toward a more per-
suasive concrete analogue: “Phosphorous and
lime existed previously to, and therefore inde-
pendently of, the formation of our bones, and in
remounting backwards, up to the time of the cre-
ation, wemust believe that these substances had
a mineral existence before they were employed
to constitute the organic frame of our first
parents. Where were then the organised beings
who could know this existence?”102 In other
words, objects must exist without a perceiving
subject to know them as such. Even sound
objects, if not their effects.
Just how close this physicalist view is to its
immaterialist counterpart can be gleaned from
the language used in a plenary address at a meet-
ing of German scientists and physicians in
Leipzig during 1874. Emil Du Bois-Reymond, a
leading voice within Germany’s scientific com-
munity and another former assistant to Müller,
spoke about “the limits of our knowledge of
nature.” It was the second such “limits” speech
he had given (two years earlier he had famously
addressed the same meeting on “the limits of
science”). And here, with a dash of blasphemy,
he flits between the objectivity of perception
and the “in itself” of objects, taking the argument
forward by positioning it as a straightforward
question of belief. “The Mosaic dictum, ‘There
was light,’ is physiologically false,” he asserts:
Light first was when the first red eye-point of an
infusorial animal for the first time distinguished
light from darkness. In the absence of the sense-
substance [Müller’s term] of sight and hearing, this
bright, glowing, resonant world around us would be
dark and voiceless. / And voiceless and dark in itself,
i.e., property-less, as the universe is on[e] subjective
decomposition of the phenomena of sense, so is it
also from the mechanical stand-point, gained by
objective contemplation. Here, in place of sound
and light, we have only the vibrations of a primitive,
undifferentiated matter, which here has become
ponderable, and there imponderable.103
Ostensibly, nothing here is new, but Bois-
Reymond’s summary lent coherence—and offi-
cial sanction—to otherwise stratified lines of
argument. Objective contemplation (the “pon-
derable”) would seem closely aligned with
Helmholtz’s longstanding aspiration to uncover
what is lawlike in perception, while the impon-
derability of real “primitive, undifferentiated
matter,” i.e., vibrating matter in the absence of
a knowing subject, had been Jobert’s central
argument in 1850. Beyond the individuals
involved, it is this acceptance of vibrations of
primitive matter that finally breaks the back of
the (neo-Berkeleyian) immateriality propounded
by Simon: vibrations of atomicmatter exist prior
to perception, but not as sound because there is
no ear to make sense of them. Aptly, the anti-
Mosaic gambit has more than a whiff of the
“end of metaphysics” here (not dissimilar to
the kind Heidegger would link to Nietzsche’s
fröliche Wissenschaft of 1882).
This essentially modern conclusion would
hold until the theory of relativity undermined
the common-sense view of matter as something
that “persists in time and moves in space.”
Writing about Lange’s text in 1925, Bertrand
Russell eagerly confirmed the demise of this
kind of materialism. “By merging time into
space-time, [relativity] has damaged the tradi-
tional notion of substance more than all the
arguments of philosophers,” he argued. “A piece
of matter has become . . . a system of inter-
related events.”104 Russell’s visualist inclination
is palpable through observations like “sound is
less important than light, and in any case raises
exactly the same problems.”105 But even at this
juncture the rhetorical limit of sound is not
exhausted. It would seem more than poetic
that his dismissal of materialism describes the
condition of acoustic sound just as Hegel had:
“Nothing is permanent, nothing endures.”106
102Jobert, Pure Sounds, 20.
103Emil du Bois-Reymond, “The Limits of our Knowledge of
Nature,” Popular Science Monthly 5 (1874): 17–32, here 20.
104He continued: “The old solidity is gone, and with it the
characteristics that, to the materialist, made matter seem
more real than fleeting thoughts.” Bertrand Russell,
“Materialism, Past and Present” (1925), rpt. in The Basic
Writings of Bertrand Russell, ed. Robert E. Egner and Lester
E. Denonn (New York: Routledge, 2009), 215. Russell would
expand on this short text two years later in The Analysis of
Matter [1927], rpt. (Nottingham: Spokesman, 2007), xii.
105Russell, The Analysis of Matter, 133.
106Russell, “Materialism, Part and Present,” 215.
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The twinned history of sound and matter en-
dures through literary device, perhaps, if not
through the aging scheme of realism.
As a further aside, it bears remembering that
Berkeley’s original proposition, in his Principles
of Human Knowledge (1710), sought to refute
the unknowability of material creation implied
in the Lockean account of perception. “If it be
demanded why I make use of the word idea,”
he had explained, “and do not rather in compli-
ance with custom, call them things, I answer . . .
because the term thing, in contradistinction to
idea, is generally supposed to denote somewhat
existing without the mind.”107 That is, he wan-
ted to allow for the possibility of ideas that were
not merely outcomes of unknowable physiologi-
cal or sensory processes, an eighteenth-century
notion still present among belletrists as much as
scientificmaterialists in themid-nineteenth cen-
tury.108 Ideas independent of bodies had offered
the certainty of being known, in other words.
The neo-Berkeleyian philosophy advocated in
his name ca. 1847 was not reactionary in this
way; instead it almost certainly responded to
Müller’s research into specific sense energies, as
noted earlier, though Müller is never named by
Simon. Jobert, upon discovering Müller’s writ-
ings in the months before the second edition of
his short book, transforms his value for the
debate by moving away from nerves and sensa-
tion (the centerpiece of his research), and toward
logic. We all admit “we do not know HOW the
fact of perception is accomplished,” he explains.
“To affirm that the object of perception is not
an external object, but only the state of our
nerves—is to decide that we know something of
the How, which it is unreservedly admitted that
we do not know.”109 Given his adherence to a
world of matter, this intellectual pirouette can-
not avoid appearing as sophistry.
And it leads us to Jobert’s final argument: that
blind, dumb and deaf witnesses “hearing” the
same chord would each perceive a separate ele-
ment from it, i.e., it would exist in different sen-
sory modalities for each witness. Even if the
same individual was simultaneously blind,
dumb, and deaf, s/he would still have a tactile
“feel,” i.e., sensation of the chord, Jobert argues,
presumably through vibrations on the skin.
“Since, therefore, the chord is proved separately
to have an existence independently of ear and
eye and of [tactility], it has an absolute existence
independent of all sensations.”110 (A similar
argument for causality would be put forward by
Russell concerning the content of an overheard
conversation.)111 Following a brief “disquisi-
tion” that broadens the topic, a conclusion, a
postscript and some further correspondence,
the book of thirty-one pages ends confident of
victory.
THE RESULT
In the event, Jobert lost the wager. His book
was sent only to the first umpire, Hensleigh
Wedgwood, a celebrated etymologist, cousin of
Charles Darwin and author of two minor trea-
tises on psychology.112 Somewhat ingloriously,
its second edition explains: “In Mr Wedgwood’s
opinion I have failed because and only because,
I have not proved that ‘the ringing of the ears is
not a pure sensation!’ . . . The verdict bears its
condemnation in its own wording. . . . How
could we have the sensation of ringing in the
ear without being possessed of one ear at least?
107George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles
of Human Knowledge, Part 1, section 39, in The Works of
George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. T. E. Jessop and
A. A. Luce, 9 vols. (London: Nelson, 1948–57), II, 57.
108One example is the writer William Hazlitt, who likened
Berkeley’s text to a fine gallery, as a “palace of thought—
another universe, built of air, of shadows, of colours.” See
Hazlitt, Sketches of the Principal Pictures Galleries in
England, in The Complete Works of William Hazlitt, ed.
P. P. Howe, 21 vols. (London: J. M. Dent: 1930–34), X, 19.
Regarding material thought, Hazlitt, in “A Farewell to
Essay-Writing,” explains: “I have brooded over an idea till
it has become a kind of substance in my brain” and later,
“my ideas, from their sinewy texture, have been to me in
the nature of realities.”Uncollected Essays, XVII, 317, 320.
109Jobert, Pure Sounds, 42.
110Ibid., 18.
111“Two men are conversing in a room, recorded by a cam-
era and by a dictaphone, while a third man observes secretly
from behind a curtain. If the dictaphone and the hiddenman
give the same report of the conversation,” he observes, “one
must suppose some causal connection, since otherwise the
coincidence is in the highest degree improbable.” Russell,
The Analysis of Matter, 209–10.
112Hensleigh Wedgwood, The Principles of Geometrical
Demonstration (London: Taylor and Walton, 1844), and
On the Development of the Understanding (London:
Taylor and Walton, 1848).
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Is not amaterial ear a condition sine qua non of a
sensation of sound?”113 Experiments on bone
conduction as early as 1858 indicate Jobert was
on the wrong path,114 but for the purposes of
his philosophical argument, imagined sound
and auscultation do not preclude the existence
of real sound, and by extension, a real external
world. And he closed defiantly by challenging
his opponent to offer a positive doctrine for
sound as pure sensation, rather than hiding
behind a negation.
In the end, the questions driving this extraor-
dinary wager come down to two principal
matters: that scientific authorities such as Bois-
Reymond accepted the existence of a real mate-
rial world—including sonic vibrations—in the
absence of a perceiving subject; that sound’s
place in this “real” external world is both pon-
derable (when perceived, and hence potentially
empirical) and imponderable (when witnessed
by no perceiving subject). The scattered discourse
of sonic ambiguity is retrievable largely via the
resources of non-canonical writings on acoustics,
andmight simply be taken as a way station in the
reception history of Müller’s specific sense ener-
gies. As such we may not regard it as particular
to sound and acoustics. But sound runs like a
red thread in the discussion: it is “sonically haun-
ted” as Veit Erlmann said of the modern condi-
tion.115 And if we return one last time to
Helmholtz’s lecture on the facts in perception,
it becomes clear that affordances particular to
auditory perception distinguish sound from other
modalities. Human hearing is at once implicated
as more precise in its relation to a putative exter-
nal reality than vision, and as uniquely structured
to differentiate unique pitches, i.e., its one-to-one
physiological (and tonotopic) mapping of vibra-
tion onto hair cell (and brain fiber) is direct.
Whereas it is possible for cone cells to form the
same shades of white and black from different
combinations of the three primary colors, fre-
quencies of pitch are unique, repeating at the
octave, but not identically.116 Second, as
WilhelmWundt pointed out in 1863, the capacity
of different sense organs to detect differences of
stimulus intensity varies significantly. While
vision requires only a 1/100 change in intensity,
and muscles require 1/17, sound and heat require
a difference in intensity of 1/3 for the change to
be noticeable.117 (His sound pendulum, a sche-
matic device in which suspended ivory balls
[P/q] fall onto a woodblock [b] from determinate
heights, shown as plate 4, illustrates the banality
of measuring the threshold for perceiving chan-
ges in sound intensity.)118 Such relative impre-
cision, following Schleiden’s complaint about
Plate 4: Wilhelm Wundt’s sound pendulum,
in Lectures on Human and Animal
Psychology, 30.
113Jobert, Pure Sounds, 33–34.
114Dr. Erhard, “The Diagnosis of Deafness,” American
Journal of the American Sciences 36 (1858): 536–37.
115Veit Erlmann, “But What of the Ethnographic Ear?”
Hearing Cultures: Essays on Sound, Listening and
Modernity, ed. Erlmann (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 5.
116“No chord sounds like any other chordwhich is composed
of different sounds, while in the eye precisely the analogue is
the case: for a similar shade of white can be produced by red
and green-blue of the spectrum; by yellow and ultramarine
blue; by green-yellow and violet; by green, red, and violet;
or in any case, by two, three or all of thesemixtures together.
Were the relations in the ear similar, then the chords C and F
would be equal-soundingwithD andG,with E andA, orwith
C, D, E, F, A, G, A, etc.” Helmholtz, “The Facts,” 346–47.
117Wundt adduces this comparison to support a general law
for apprehending sensation differences: “that the increase of
stimulus necessary to produce an equally noticeable differ-
ence of sensation ears a constant ratio to the total stimulus-
intensity.” Wundt, Lectures on Human and Animal
Psychology [1863], 2nd German edn., trans. J. E. Creighton
and E. B. Titchener (New York: Macmillan, 1907), 31.
118Ibid., 30.
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our poor capacity to determine the direction
of a sound source, lends weight to the notion
that sound and abstraction were associable
on the grounds of imprecision. By positioning
artistic instinct as law-defining for perception,
Helmholtz inverted this characteristic impre-
cision into a monumental strength, and
thereby sought a means of reconciling no less
than the physicalist and experiential account
of sound, a materialist and phenomenological
account of the world.
Sound’s lack of intuitively tangiblematter dur-
ing this period set it up as a troublesome object
for epistemology. It would remain so, promp-
ting recent studies in sonic virtuality to address
wholly related tangles over definition, disciplin-
ary perspective, and reality principle.119 During
the late nineteenth century, the perception of
space remained perhaps one of the most closely
related phenomena in that both space and sound
are invisible, intangible, and inferred at a distance
by sense tactility in the absence of touch. It is
no coincidence, then, that the Land-Helmholtz
debate arose in the context of whether intui-
tions of non-Euclidian space are possible via
mathematical axioms. At stake was nothing
less than the discipline of philosophy itself. If
it were established beyond doubt that the
“object” and the “real” are simply one and
the same, Land had protested, “all examination
of [philosophical] questions and theories could
become an empty ceremony.”120 The liminal
condition of sound and space resisted any such
conflation, safeguarding—by implication—the
enterprise of philosophy, no less, in the late
century. In a modern context, something of
this condition is captured in Jean-Luc Nancy’s
concept of the areal, defined as both: “the
nature and specificity of an aire [area]” but also
suggestive of “a lack of reality, or rather a
slight, faint, suspended reality.”121 Perhaps the
slight reality of nineteenth-century sound—
traceable as neither immaterial substance nor
pure sensation—could only crystallize in rela-
tion to spatial intuition, as an invitation to
abstraction.
If, as Helmholtz claimed, the impulse to ratio-
nalize experience into laws is innately human,
the complementary impulse to possess the
object of sensory fascination is no less relevant.
Underlying the quest for understanding sonic
experience after the dam of idealism had broken
was therefore in part a desire for tactile owner-
ship, for possessing the object of musical experi-
ence. As Nancy puts it: “We’re obsessed with
showing a this, and with showing (ourselves)
that this this, here, is the thing we can’t see
or touch, either here or anywhere else—and
that this is that, not just in any way, but as
its body . . . that’s our obsession. . . . We shall
have wanted the assurance, the unconditional
certainty of a THIS IS: here it is, nothing more,
absolutely, here it is, here, this one, the same
thing.”122 If such comments mock the quest
for the absolute as a problem of possession,
Helmholtz ultimately aligned himself with a
quest for the real, but as a problem of lawful-
ness. By using this to bridge the epistemology
of sense organs and artistic perception, he
envisaged drawing artistic knowledge into the
methods of empiricism. But in a reciprocal ges-
ture, this also achieved an unspoken
corollary: it justified a quantitative plat-
form for aesthetics.
Abstract.
In 1878, at the height of his fame, Helmholtz asked
what was objective in perception, declaring that—in
contrast to empirical science—it is the “artist [who]
has beheld the real.” His lecture sought to show how
sensory perception can be law-like, and how the effects
of art are ultimately grounded in such law-likeness.
Such a claim for an objective measure of perception
was not unprecedented, yet it failed to distinguish
cleanly between what is objective and what is real,
opening up a discursive space regarding what sound
“is,” andwhat its objective perceptionmay be. Its argu-
ments followed calls for “a science of beauty” based on
number, and was motivated, in part, by Helmholtz’s
attempt to distance himself from the “weaknesses of
Romanticism.” This articles argues that Helmholtz’s
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bold claims were only possible on the basis of the writ-
ings of German materialists during the 1840s and 50s,
and because sound had been figured for decades as an
ambiguous object.
On this basis, the article considers the role of sound
within epistemological debates over sense perception
andconcepts of the real during the later nineteenth cen-
tury. It examines the ways in which sound’s abstract
character became co-opted within Anglo-German dis-
courseconcerningobjectiveperceptionand the scientif-
ically real, initially through the lens of Helmholtz’s
1878 lecture, but later broadening this focus to include
the mid-century architects of a philosophical material-
ism, as well as their detractors. A closing case study,
a closely documented wager between a geologist and
a philosopher about the “real” of sound ca. 1850,
demonstrates the imaginative uses of sound as a met-
onym for philosophical debate. This raises questions
about the relation of sensation and number, the con-
tested affinity between sound and concepts of the
absolute, and the underlying desire to possess objects
of sensory experience. Keywords: Helmholtz, objec-
tivity, perception, sound, reality, materialism
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